PAYNE INSTITUTE COMMENTARY SERIES: EXPLAINER

By Rebecca Jackson and Brad Handler

June 17, 2026

In December 2022, the number of operating units in the U.S. nuclear energy fleet reached a low of 92, down from a peak of 112 in 1990[1].  Reactors were closing faster than they were coming online: Palisades, Michigan shut down on May 20, 2022 while Diablo Canyon, California was under threat of closure. New builds, Vogtle Units 3 and 4 were inching towards completion, but excitement was limited given an ever-bloating budget and timeline. The fate of the fleet was uncertain. The prevailing perspective was that nuclear was just too expensive and insufficiently safe, while public concerns about how to handle nuclear waste lingered.

Fast forward to the present and the tone is very different: major tech companies have announced multiple agreements with reactor companies and utilities as they seek reliable, low carbon power for data center expansion; public perception has improved; and government support has intensified in the current administration. The U.S. stance towards nuclear energy is now underpinned by the goal to quadruple capacity to 400 GW by 2050[2].

Successive administrations have provided support to the industry via funding for advanced reactor development and tax credits for new and existing plants, among other mechanisms. However, in more recent years the fuel cycle has gained more attention. For example, 2023 brought the Nuclear Fuel Security Act with measures to secure HALEU[3] availability and 2024 saw the enactment of the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act, banning imports of Russian material and establishing funding for domestic uranium enrichment capacity. In May 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14302, ‘Reinvigorating the Nuclear Industrial Base’[4], which included an uncommon invocation of Section 708 of the Defense Production Act (DPA) to form the Defense Production Act Nuclear Fuel Cycle Consortium.

Advanced reactor new builds have broken ground and broader momentum is growing. The first reactor in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Reactor Pilot Program attained criticality at the Idaho National Laboratory on June 4.[5] The advanced reactor pipeline is also expanding fast: from various reports and announcements, we estimate a route to ~14 GW of new capacity from SMRs and microreactors by 2040, which could be complemented by ~9 GW of large reactors. By 2050, plans and announcements offer a route to more than 65 GW of total capacity additions[6]. And, while any capacity addition through 2030 will be smaller, it is certainly not immaterial. Life extensions will sustain the fleet, while three restarts and several anticipated power uprates could deliver more than 4 GW in incremental capacity.

The U.S. nuclear renaissance cannot happen without a commensurate investment in the nuclear fuel cycle, which at the front end, includes mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, and fabrication. Even without a single new reactor coming online, the increase in annual uranium requirements for the U.S. fleet from the low in 2022 to 2030 could be ~7%, given uprates, restarts, and new units. Should the U.S. realize the ~65 GW of potential capacity additions by 2050, total annual uranium requirements could rise to ~35,000 tonnes U₃O₈.[7] To put this in context, the highest domestic output of U₃O₈ was ~20,000 tonnes in 1980.[8]

Fuel cycle infrastructure additions take time, with some stages better positioned than others. The very start of the value chain – mining – is where the biggest gap lines. The U.S. effectively abandoned uranium extraction, not dissimilar to its retreat from producing other critical minerals. Presently, more than 60% of mined uranium comes from just two countries: Canada and Kazakhstan. In 2024, the U.S. contributed less than 1% of global production[9], and only 1% of the domestic fleet’s needs. Domestic production more than tripled year over year in 2025to 980 tonnes U₃O₈ in 2025[10], but that still only equates to 4% of U.S. reactor requirements.[11]

Further down the value chain there are more challenges. A large portion of processing capacity (conversion and enrichment) is concentrated in Russia while Western capacity has atrophied. The U.S currently has just one commercial-scale conversion facility and one, albeit foreign-owned, commercial-scale enrichment plant[12]. Bringing nuclear fuel-cycle facilities online carries complexity given the nuclear-specific licensing, safety, security, and decommissioning requirements, alongside capital needs and timelines.

However, U.S. policy is driving change. Coordinated by the DOE, the DPA Nuclear Fuel Consortium held its first public meeting in October 2025[13] and now convenes over 90 U.S. companies. At the second public meeting in April 2026, it confirmed three goals: to “catalyze a secure and cost-competitive domestic fuel supply chain”; “accelerate advanced reactor deployment and close the fuel cycle”; and “explore how the DPA framework can be activated to grow and align workforce, finance, innovation and collaboration in support of nuclear build out.”[14] The deployment of the Consortium mechanism is an “unprecedented tool in the nuclear industry”[15] and underlines the degree to which the industry tides are turning.

In short, there is much activity in the U.S. nuclear energy industry. To help those seeking an understanding of the current fuel cycle landscape and its possible evolution, the Payne Institute is publishing a two-part primer series. Part one, released along with this introduction, addresses the front-end of the current nuclear fuel cycle — mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication — primarily pertaining to the existing light-water reactor fleet. It also touches on the policy landscape and market mechanics and price formation. The forthcoming second part will focus on the back-end of the fuel cycle (spent fuel, storage, and waste disposal) as well as innovations and alternative supply opportunities, specifically from various waste sources.

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We would like to thank the following members of faculty at the Colorado School of Mines for their feedback and technical support in producing this piece:

Dr. Tom Brady, Professor of Practice of Economics and Business

Dr. Linda Figueroa, Professor, Civil and Environmental Engineering

Dr. Mark Jensen, Professor of Chemistry, Jerry and Tina Grandey University Chair in Nuclear Science and Engineering

Anna Littlefield, Payne Institute Geothermal and Low Carbon Technologies Program Manager and Research Associate

Dr. Jenifer Shafer, Professor of Chemistry, Ben L. Fryrear Presidential Chair in Energy

References

[1] See EIA “Table 8.1 Nuclear Energy Overview” from the “Monthly Energy Review” – https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/

[2] “Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission”, Executive Order 14300, May 23, 2025, The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/05/ordering-the-reform-of-the-nuclear-regulatory-commission/

[3]HALEU is “High-Assay Low Enriched Uranium” which is enriched to 5-19.75% U-235 (compared to 3-5% for Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU))

[4] “Reinvigorating the Nuclear Industrial Base”, Executive Order 14302, May 23, 2025, The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/05/reinvigorating-the-nuclear-industrial-base/

[5] “Department of Energy Celebrates First Advanced Reactor Criticality”, June 4, 2026, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), https://www.energy.gov/articles/department-energy-celebrates-first-advanced-reactor-criticality

[6] Reflects an indicative Payne Institute estimate based upon public announcements and reports by reactor companies, utilities, government agencies, regulators, and industry organizations with varying degrees of certainty

[7] Actual annual requirements will vary depending on the designs deployed, their individual burnup rates and capacity factors etc. New reactors typically require a larger initial core inventory than for their subsequent annual replacement fuel requirements

[8] See EIA “Table 8.2 Uranium Overview” from the “Monthly Energy Review” – https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/

[9] “World Uranium Mining Production”, Updated Tuesday, 20 January 2026, World Nuclear Association, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-uranium/world-uranium-mining-production

[10] See EIA “Table 8.2 Uranium Overview” from the “Monthly Energy Review” – https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/

[11] Total U.S. reactor requirements for 2025 is stated at 19,011 tU (22,419 tU3O8) per “World Nuclear Power Reactors & Uranium Requirements”, Last updated June 16, 2026, World Nuclear Association, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/facts-and-figures/world-nuclear-power-reactors-and-uranium-requireme

[12] Urenco USA’s New Mexico facility is the only currently operating commercial-scale enrichment facility in the U.S. Other facilities are being developed or expanded to produce LEU and HALEU.

[13] “DOE Nuclear Fuel Cycle DPA Consortium: First Official Meeting, October 23, 2025”, Published November 21, 2025, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WqkxrrnGyY0

[14] “Department of Energy’s Defense Production Act Consortium Unveils New Initiative to Grow Nation’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle”, April 23, 2026, Office of Nuclear Energy, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/department-energys-defense-production-act-consortium-unveils-new-initiative-grow

[15] “DOE Nuclear Fuel Cycle DPA Consortium: First Official Meeting, October 23, 2025”, Published November 21, 2025, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WqkxrrnGyY0

ABOUT THE PAYNE INSTITUTE

The mission of the Payne Institute at Colorado School of Mines is to provide world-class scientific insights, helping to inform and shape public policy on earth resources, energy, and environment. The Institute was established with an endowment from Jim and Arlene Payne and seeks to link the strong scientific and engineering research and expertise at Mines with issues related to public policy and national security.

The Payne Institute Commentary Series offers independent insights and research on a wide range of topics related to energy, natural resources, and environmental policy. The series accommodates three categories namely: Viewpoints, Essays, and Working Papers.

Visit us at www.payneinstitute.mines.edu

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DISCLAIMER: The opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the opinions, beliefs, viewpoints, or official policies of the Payne Institute or the Colorado School of Mines.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Rebecca Jackson, Payne Institute Affiliated Partner
Rebecca Jackson is an affiliated partner of The Payne Institute for Public Policy. She also works with financial services firms supporting strategy, communications, and research. Previously she was the COO of an investment management firm and prior held various roles at an investment bank. She recently completed a graduate certificate at the J.P. Morgan Center for Commodities & Energy Management at the University of Colorado Denver Business School.

Brad Handler, Payne Institute Program Director, Energy Finance Lab, and Researcher
Brad Handler is a researcher and heads the Payne Institute’s Energy Finance Lab. He is also the Principal and Founder of Energy Transition Research LLC. He has recently had articles published in the Financial Times, Washington Post, Nasdaq.com, Petroleum Economist, Transition Economist, WorldOil, POWER Magazine, The Conversation and The Hill. Brad is a former Wall Street Equity Research Analyst with 20 years’ experience covering the Oilfield Services & Drilling (OFS) sector at firms including Jefferies and Credit Suisse. He has an M.B.A from the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University and a B.A. in Economics from Johns Hopkins University.